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The Problem of Unresolved Wrongdoing
Kenneth Einar Himma

Many Christians believe that, because of divine grace, any person who repents of sin, accepts Christianity, and has genuinely authentic faith in God is
forgiven for her sins and spared completely of the torments of hell. I argue that
this idea is difficult to reconcile with certain Christian doctrines and common,
though not universal, moral intuitions about wrongdoing and punishment.
The main steps are as follows. The violation of an obligation creates a moral
debt that requires correction by compensation, punishment, and/or forgiveness; a wrong that is never punished, compensated, or forgiven perpetuates
a continuing injustice by leaving a debt unpaid. If it is true that one person’s
forgiveness cannot release the wrongdoer of a moral debt owed to someone
else, then God’s forgiveness cannot release a wrongdoer from the moral debts
she owes to human victims of her wrongs. Something must be done, as a
moral matter, to deal with those existing moral debts before a saved sinner
can enjoy the eternal bliss promised to the faithful.

I. Introduction
Many Christians believe that, because of divine grace, it is sufficient for
salvation that one instantiate certain mental states at the time of one’s
death. Any person who repents of sin, accepts Christianity, and has genuinely authentic faith in God is forgiven for her sins and spared completely
of the torments of hell. Even the most evil people can be saved, getting
nothing by way of divine punishment. Indeed, a genuine conversion occurring during a person’s dying breaths is sufficient, on the traditional
view, to be spared of divine punishment and enjoy the infinite benefits
of salvation.
I argue that these views about salvation are difficult to reconcile with
certain Christian doctrines and common, though not universal,1 moral intuitions about wrongdoing and punishment. The main steps are as follows. The violation of an obligation creates a moral debt that requires correction by compensation, punishment, and/or forgiveness; a wrong that
is never punished, compensated, or forgiven perpetuates a continuing injustice by leaving a debt unpaid. If it is true that one person’s forgiveness
1
It is important at the outset to acknowledge that these intuitions are not universal among
Christians; if the reader rejects one of the intuitive claims I assume, then my argument does
not work. But they are sufficiently common (and reasonable) that they should seem at least
prima facie plausible even to readers inclined to reject them. The rejection of any one, it seems
to me, requires some sort of argument.
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cannot release the wrongdoer of a moral debt owed to someone else, then
God’s forgiveness cannot release a wrongdoer from the moral debts she
owes to human victims of her wrongs. Something must be done, as a moral matter, to deal with those existing moral debts before a saved sinner can
enjoy the eternal bliss promised to the faithful. I do not make any claims
about exactly what the specific nature of this additional element should
be, but I suggest that there are some cases requiring punitive or quasipunitive response.
II. Moral Wrongs and Corrective Justice
It is natural to think of moral wrongs as creating debts owed to the person
who has been wronged. If A has a claim or right against B, then violation
of that right seems to create some sort of moral “debt”; since the claim belongs to A, the debt seems owed to A. Likewise, if B owes A an obligation,
then violation of that obligation entails that A has been wronged. But the
wrong seems to create a debt by putting A in a worse position than she
otherwise should have been. Since the obligation was owed to A, the debt
seems also owed to A.
To the extent that wrongdoing creates some sort of moral “debt” on the
part of the wrongdoer, many instances of human wrongdoing will create
multiple debts. All human wrongdoing creates a debt arising from the
wrong against God. But much human wrongdoing will also create debts
arising from the wrongs against its human victims.2 Murder, for example,
will create at least two debts: a debt owed to God from its being sin and
a debt owed to the victim from its violating the victim’s right to life.3 Indeed, murder will create a host of debts to those friends and relatives who
have lost a loved one—and might even involve a wrong against an entire
community as a breach of the peace.
These various debts are morally independent in the following sense:
they are specific as to victims. While certain victimless wrongdoing, if
such there be, may create some sort of generalized debt or may create no
debt at all, wrongdoing that occurs against a victim creates a debt owed to
that victim. If a murderer kills someone’s father, his wrongdoing creates
2
Richard Swinburne offers a similar account in Swinburne, Responsibility and Atonement
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 81–109. I am indebted to a referee for making
me aware of this discussion.
3
One might think the principle “ought implies can” entails that one cannot owe a debt to
a murder victim because one cannot possibly discharge that debt. But “ought implies can”
excludes cases in which the person owing a duty has culpably put himself or herself in a position where the duty cannot be satisfied. A drunk driver who hits a wall cannot excuse her
conduct by arguing that it was impossible for her to drive responsibly because she was intoxicated; “ought implies can” does not apply in any way favorable to the drunk driver. Notice
that this is a different objection from the objection that one cannot owe a dead person a moral
obligation or a debt since the person is no longer there; one can take this position, but this
would entail denying that we have an obligation to a decedent to distribute her property according to the terms of her will. The intuition that we can owe duties to dead people and have
debts to them is a common one that grounds many legal duties apparently owed to decedents
as well as moral duties. I am indebted to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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debts owed to God, the murder victim, and the victim’s child. But these
debts are distinct because the act results in multiple wrongs: the transgression of God’s law, the violation of the victim’s right to life, and the
violation of the wrongdoer’s obligation to that child not to wrongfully
jeopardize his well-being.
The metaphorical idea that wrongdoing creates debts that must be resolved in some way is at the foundation of ideas about “corrective justice.” Theories of corrective justice, unlike utilitarian theories of justice,
are wholly backward looking: whereas utilitarian theories emphasize the
future consequences to community well-being, corrective theories emphasize the need to rectify existing injustices that arise from past wrongful
acts. Theories of corrective justice see various individual or societal responses to wrongdoing as a way of correcting or rectifying moral debts
created by wrongful acts.
The idea that these injustices must, as a moral matter, be corrected or
rectified is most plausibly explained in terms of some legitimate expectation or right that the victim has in virtue of having the right kind of moral
standing. Qua moral person, I have a moral right to be compensated for
injuries caused by a person’s culpable behavior. Qua moral person, I have
a moral right that persons who commit criminal acts against me be punished—not necessarily as some sort of expression of vengeance or retaliation, but as a way of acknowledging my worth as an intrinsically (and
hence morally) valuable being. Wrongdoing that victimizes me creates a
debt owed to me and that must in some way be discharged by me or paid
to me. While this does not preclude a response that is initiated by other
entities (such as a morally legitimate state) or other persons (such as God)
that would contribute to “resolving the debt,” the efficacy of this response
depends on its addressing the fact that the debt is owed to me.
Now it is crucial to note that no claim is being made here that we have
rights against God or that God owes us obligations—a contentious view.
What is claimed here is that other people create debts owed to us because
we have rights against them and those other people owe obligations to us.
While I will make certain claims about what God must do given God’s
moral perfection, they do not depend on taking the view either that God
owes us obligations or that we have rights against God.4
III. Corrective Justice and Traditional Christianity
There is much here not entirely clear. It is easy to see how forgiveness
might suffice, as a moral matter, to resolve a debt; forgiveness is not unlike any other consensual act by which an obligor releases a person from
an obligation. Insofar as I can waive an obligation owed to me by another
person in advance (e.g., by consenting to a person’s entry upon my property, I temporarily waive my right to exclude her from such), it seems
reasonable to think that I can completely release a party from a moral debt
I am indebted to anonymous referee for making me aware of the need to make this point.

4
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to me created by a breach of an obligation owed to me by an act of forgiveness. Indeed, this seems to be the conceptual point of forgiveness. If so, the
moral ledger is at least partly restored by an act of forgiveness as between
offender and offended.
It is not clear that punishment can fully address the moral debt. Punishment might be deserved and thereby avoid the further injustice of allowing a wrongdoer to get away with wrong. It might even square the
moral ledger in some cases. But it seems implausible to think that full
punishment necessarily evens the moral ledger. Punishing the murderer
of someone I love, after all, does nothing to diminish my loss; but, more
importantly, punishment does not balance the ledger between murderer
and victim because it cannot bring the victim back to life.
The same considerations apply to compensation. It might be some
wrongs result in injury that can be fully compensated so as to balance the
moral ledger; if, for example, A takes $5.00 from B in an armed robbery,
then A can fully compensate B for the economic effects of theft: $5.00 compounded by the relevant interest rate fully compensates for the economic
injury (assuming the only injury is economic). But some wrongs simply
cannot be adequately compensated. For example, there is nothing a murderer can do to compensate the murder victim for the loss of life. And
I doubt a murderer can fully compensate a victim’s loved ones for their
losses. Monetary compensation is extremely limited in what it can do to
rectify moral debts.
Even a fully compensated loss might still need the help of punishment
to balance the moral ledger. Even if the victim of the robbery’s only injuries
are economic and are fully compensated, I would surmise that most readers would agree that the robber should still be punished—indeed, even if
the victim has forgiven the wrongdoer and even if no utilitarian benefits
are thereby achieved; in this case, punishment is necessary to restore the
moral ledger because the robber should, as a moral matter, get the punishment she deserves for her crime. This suggests that, in some cases, no one
corrective measure will be enough to balance the moral ledger and that all
three might be required.
The idea that wrongdoing requires punishment, compensation, forgiveness, or some combination of the three seems central not only to ordinary moral (and legal) practices and judgments, but also to traditional
Christianity. To begin with, the traditional view that nonbelievers deserve
eternity in hell as divine punishment for sins presupposes a retributivist
and hence corrective view of punishment. Moreover, ordinary norms of
corrective justice seem reflected in the common view that God’s forgiveness is needed to justifiably spare sinners of punishment. On this view,
God’s forgiveness helps to balance the ledger between God and sinner insofar as it releases the sinner from the debt to God that arises from sin—a
necessary prerequisite for sparing the sinner the punishment she deserves;
thus, a morally perfect God could not simply spare all sinners without a
mediating act of forgiveness.
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IV. Faith as a Sufficient Condition for Avoiding Divine Punishment
It is generally thought that faith in Jesus is a sufficient condition for being
forgiven by God and spared all divine punishment. First, faith in Christ is
a sufficient condition for salvation. John 3:16 states, for example, that “For
God so loved the world that he gave his one and only Son, that whoever
believes in him shall not perish but have eternal life.” Faith, of course,
includes propositional belief that the core doctrines of Christianity are
true, but it also involves a commitment to do the will of God and hence
involves some kind of sincere behavioral commitment. Second, the result
of salvation is that the sinner is completely spared of punishment. These
two claims, then, yield the familiar view: genuine faith in Jesus Christ is a
sufficient condition for an eternal life in bliss free of the suffering associated with punitive or quasi-punitive measures.
What entirely determines one’s ultimate fate on this traditional view,
then, is whether one instantiates the proper mental states (hereinafter CMS
for “the Christian mental state”) at the time of one’s death. If one believes
that the relevant tenets of Christianity are true and has the right sort of
mental states (which includes continuing repentance and a commitment
to accept and follow Jesus), then it doesn’t matter whether one actually
has an opportunity to express those commitments in good works—either
because one has certain disabilities or because one’s lifespan is too short
to realize those commitments. Nor, strictly speaking, does it matter with
respect to the character of one’s ultimate fate what sort of life one has led
up to the point of instantiating the appropriate mental states. Instantiation
of CMS is sufficient to ensure the forgiveness of sins and immunity, so to
speak, from divine punishment.
V. Salvation, Limited Authority to Forgive, and Unresolved Evil:
The Problem
The preceding analysis implies that people can be saved any time prior to
death. If instantiating CMS is a sufficient condition for salvation and hence
for escaping eternal punishment, then salvation is possible for as long as
an individual is able to instantiate CMS. The thief who died on the cross
next to Jesus was saved by his last-second repentance and acceptance of
Jesus and thereby spared of all divine punishment.
Viewed from one angle, this is as it should be. The forgiveness of the
party wronged seems at least sometimes, if not always, sufficient to wholly
release the wrongdoer from the debt created by her wrongdoing and hence
to wholly balance the moral ledger between wrongdoer and wronged.
Moreover, the willingness to freely forgive, at the very least, is usually a
profound moral virtue. Thus, it seems utterly unproblematic, as a moral
matter, that an omnibenevolent and loving God is always willing to release
a repentant sinner from her debt by a gracious act of forgiveness.
But ordinary moral intuitions suggest that one party’s forgiveness is sufficient to release a wrongdoer from only that part of the moral debt that is
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owed to her in consequence of the wrongdoer’s misdeed.5 If, for example, A
steals something jointly belonging to B and C, then A has wronged both B
and C and is morally indebted to both B and C. While B’s forgiveness may
suffice to release A from the debt owed to B, it does nothing to release A
from the debt owed to C. To resolve the moral debt owed by A to C, at least
one of the three things must happen: (1) A receives punishment on C’s behalf from a legitimate representative of C; (2) A compensates C for damages caused by A’s wrongdoing; or (3) C freely forgives A. For this reason, the
unilateral acts of B cannot resolve the evil created by A’s wrongful conduct
towards C. On ordinary views, one agent’s forgiveness is not sufficient, as a
matter of moral principle, to release another from the wrongs she commits
against other agents. The authority to release moral debts through forgiveness is limited only to debts owed to the person who is wronged.
This creates a general problem for traditional Christianity best illustrated by first considering how it arises in connection with deathbed conversions. Suppose that Hitler had not committed suicide (dying instead
of other causes), had experienced a genuine conversion on his deathbed,
and died instantiating CMS. Despite the fact that he is responsible for millions of murders, Hitler’s instantiation of CMS spares him of the eternal
punishment he would otherwise have received. His fate after judgment,
according to traditional Christianity, is an eternal and infinitely fulfilling
communion with God.
Hitler’s behavior results in a horrifically large number of wrongs. Each
of Hitler’s murders sins against God and creates a moral debt owed to
God. Furthermore each of these murders wrongs not only the victims but
also the victim’s surviving friends and family (and possibly humanity itself). Every such act, then, creates a profound and complex moral disturbance that involves large moral debts to God and to each of a potentially
very large class of human beings.
God’s forgiveness releases Hitler from the debts he owes to God, but it
cannot, if ordinary moral intuitions are correct, release Hitler from those
he owes to his human victims. These intuitions suggest that only the creditor/obligor can release the debtor/obligee from her debt by forgiveness. Of
course, as was noted earlier, there may be other ways to resolve the debt,
which include punishment of or compensation by the wrongdoer. But if
neither punishment nor compensation occurs, then only an act of forgiveness on the part of the victim can, according to ordinary moral intuitions,
suffice to release the wrongdoer from her debt to the victim—although
it is important to recall that there are some cases where even forgiveness
does not suffice.
5
This view is taken for granted in the literature on forgiveness. See, e.g., Howard McGary,
“Forgiveness,” American Philosophical Quarterly 26 (1989), pp. 343–350; Jeffrie Murphy, “Forgiveness and Resentment,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 7 (1982), p. 504; Paul M. Hughes,
“What is Involved in Forgiving?” Journal of Value Inquiry 27 (1993), pp. 331–340; and Aurel
Kolnai, “Forgiveness,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74 (1973–1974), pp. 91–106. I am
indebted to Paul Hughes for this point.
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Hitler’s immediate salvation would, thus, leave many unpaid moral
debts in the world. Given that (1) Hitler’s wrongdoing has not been forgiven by each of his victims, (2) Hitler’s victims have not been compensated
for the wrongs they experienced, and (3) Hitler receives no punishment,
his salvation leaves tremendous moral debt in the world that would, if the
traditional view is correct, remain forever unpaid.
The problem is not limited to the case of deathbed conversions. It arises
for all of us—even people who have been committed Christians since they
reached the age of reason. Even the best of lifelong Christians are prone
to lusting after (or objectifying), judging, envying, and deceiving others.
Such acts violate not only our obligations to God, but also obligations
owed to the victims of those acts; accordingly, these acts create a large
number of debts that are owed to beings other than God.
While each of these human debts may seem comparatively small (as
compared to the debts created by murder), they seem to add up to something significant over a lifetime. I can’t, e.g., remember a day in which I
didn’t experience illicit lust or make a harsh judgment about someone.
Though I try to prevent myself from such acts, I am a sinner who continuously adds to the human debts I owe.
Most of the wrongness that I introduce into the world remains unresolved despite continuing repentance. Indeed, the vast majority of people
I wrong with those mental states have no idea they have been wronged
by me. Accordingly, it is highly unlikely that such persons might have
directed an act of forgiveness towards me. No matter how hard I try, my
death will leave significant debts to others that will remain unforgiven
and unpaid—something true of all of us sinners. The moral debts my sins
create, if I receive no divine punishment, will hence remain unresolved.
The idea that God would leave unresolved evil in the world is difficult
to reconcile with God’s moral perfection. A person with authority to judge
and redress the wrongdoing of others has a moral obligation to exercise
that authority in a way that resolves as many of the wrongdoer’s debts
as possible. A judge who unilaterally decided to, say, throw out all civil
suits if she became convinced of the defendant’s repentance and remorse
would be acting wrongly—and this is true even if (1) the judge were infallible in discerning the appropriate mental states and (2) the parties and
public all understood this. (Of course, judges are not infallible, but that
is not relevant. The point is that we would have the same reaction even
if somehow a judge could ascertain this in a particular defendant with
demonstrable certainty.)
The problem of unresolved evil, then, is to reconcile ordinary understandings of what morality requires of authority in dispensing justice with
the traditional Christian view that any person can avoid divine punishment simply by instantiating CMS at the time of her death. The claim that
instantiation of CMS is sufficient for avoiding all punishment is in conspicuous tension with the common view that justice demands that moral
debts be resolved when possible.
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VI. Objections and Replies
A. God’s Authority to Efficaciously Forgive Is Not Limited
One might respond that God’s authority to forgive is not subject to familiar standards of corrective justice and that God’s forgiveness, unlike ours,
is capable of resolving not only moral debts owed to God, but also moral
debts owed to other beings. On this view, divine forgiveness restores the
balance of justice disturbed by a person’s wrongdoing as between all affected parties. Different standards of corrective justice apply to God in
virtue of God’s special moral status in the world; the ordinary ones governing our behavior are inapplicable to God’s acts.
There are a number of reasons for rejecting this claim. To begin with, it
is not clear how any of God’s perfections could enable God’s forgiveness
to annul debts owed to third parties. God’s omnipotence does not seem
relevant because the problem of resolving evil in the world is less a causal
matter than it is a moral matter. My ability to cancel a debt by forgiving it
is not achieved by means of a series of causes and effects that begins with
my willing an act of forgiveness; the relevant ability or capacity is primarily moral, rather than causal, in nature. If the notion of omnipotence
picks out purely causal abilities, then God’s omnipotence cannot ground
the ability to annul moral debts owed to others.
Nor is it clear how God’s moral or epistemic perfection would give rise
to this capacity. Indeed, it is not even clear that the claim that an omniscient, morally perfect being has forgiven P entails even the claim that it
would be unjust for other persons not to forgive P (because the wrongs
against God are distinct from, and arise under different moral standards
from, those against other persons). Here it is worth noting that mere repentance does not, according to traditional Christianity, suffice to elicit a
forgiving response from God; in addition, the penitent must accept core
Christian doctrine and direct a personal petition to God asking for forgiveness. God’s forgiveness is thus a response to a personal gesture that
is directed to God. If a being may withhold forgiveness in the absence of
such a gesture without violating an obligation, then the claim that God
has forgiven P does not entail that it is unjust for persons who have not
been asked by P for forgiveness to withhold it from P.
But even if the claim that God forgives P implies that it is unjust for any
person to withhold forgiveness from P, the claim that it is unjust for anyone not to release P from her debts doesn’t imply that P is released from
all debts.6 I think, e.g., that the U.S. has a moral obligation to release Third
World countries from their stifling financial debts to the U.S., but I do not
think that this fact succeeds, as a moral matter, in releasing them from those
6
It is worth noting that anyone who is already saved will have forgiven all wrongdoing against them; it is reasonable to think that a person cannot be fully Christian without
forgiving transgressions committed against her—as, for example, is suggested by the Lord’s
Prayer. This means that the problem of unresolved evil, strictly speaking, will arise only for
those who have not been saved. I am indebted to Steve Layman for pointing this out to me.
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debts. The notion that one person might unjustly demand satisfaction of
a moral debt is not clearly false or conceptually incoherent. Accordingly,
it is not clear how God’s special moral status would explain why special
standards of corrective justice afford God the ability to release wrongdoers
from debts owed to other persons by an act of divine forgiveness.
Finally, it is worth noting that something like this move is equally applicable to every problem of philosophical theology implicating God’s moral
perfection. The problem of evil disappears if we assume God’s agency is
not subject to the same moral standards as ours; so there is no reason to
think that the amount of evil needs a philosophical reconciliation with
God’s moral perfection. Likewise for the proportionality objection to the
traditional doctrine of hell: ordinary people might be morally constrained
to punish wrongdoing proportionately, but God is not: as creator and sovereign of the world, God has moral liberty to punish people as harshly and
disproportionately as God pleases.
At the end of the day, all this might be correct. But resting on any such
claim without argument seems curiously ad hoc because we assume that
we understand morality well enough to see that ordinary norms apply to
God as well—and this is, again, presupposed in our philosophical theology. The proportionality problem is a problem only if the ordinary standards governing our institutions of punishment also apply to God. The
problem of evil is a problem only if ordinary standards having to do with
the circumstances under which someone who can prevent evil and knows
about it should do so also apply to God. The divine command theory can
be rejected on the strength of the claim that it falsely implies that God’s
commands could make it obligatory to torture newborn infants for fun
only if God’s commands are subject to ordinary moral standards. The
problem of the atonement is a problem only if we assume that ordinary
moral standards dictating that good people who can prevent gratuitous
suffering without significant cost to themselves should do so. The whole
point of atonement theories is to show how Jesus’s suffering was not gratuitous. Indeed, in the case of the stronger theories, the point is to show
that Jesus’s suffering is necessary to secure the great moral good of divine
forgiveness of human sin.
B. Is a Person’s Repentance Sufficient to Resolve All Moral Debts?
One might, however, think that it would be morally problematic for God to
punish Hitler because he has repented and accepted Christ, but this claim
seems hard to justify. As far as our criminal justice practices are concerned
(which track ordinary moral judgments), repentance is not sufficient to
effect a complete release of the wrongdoer from the debt her behavior creates: even in cases where there is no plausible doubt about the criminal’s
repentance, she is rightly required to submit to some sort of punishment.
This is not to deny that remorse and repentance play some justified
role in reducing punishment. Judges and juries will sometimes reduce the
level of punishment to take into account the criminal’s remorsefulness, but
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this is most plausibly characterized as an act of mercy made possible by
something approximating institutional forgiveness. Similarly, convicted
criminals can reduce the time they must serve in prison by good behavior
and productive use of their time, but this is most plausibly characterized
as being justified by pragmatic considerations: in most cases, the criminal will be returned to society, and it is in everyone’s interests that she
develop skills and character traits that facilitate her assimilation into the
law-abiding population. Rarely, if ever, is someone who is convicted of a
reasonably serious offense allowed to escape punishment entirely on the
strength of her repentance.
If natural law retributivist Michael S. Moore is correct, these legal practices reflect intuitions shared by most people:
[Suppose that a] murderer has truly found Christ, for example, so that he or
she does not need to be reformed; he or she is not dangerous for the same
reason; and the crime can go undetected so that general deterrence does not
demand punishment (alternatively, we can pretend to punish and pay the
person the money the punishment would have cost us to keep his or her
mouth shut, which will also serve the ends of deterrence). In such a situation, should the criminal still be punished? My hypothesis is that most of us
still feel some inclination, no matter how tentative, to punish.7

As an empirical matter, I have described a similar thought experiment
to at least 1000 students. Fewer than 2 percent of my students take the
position that the murderer should go free. If these admittedly anecdotal
considerations are a reliable indication, most people share the intuition
that justice demands that serious wrongdoing be punished—which helps
to explain why most of us are content with the relevant criminal justice
practices. Insofar as one shares these intuitions, they create problems for
the idea that a person’s repentance alone is enough to resolve the debts she
owes to other people.
It is true that we are never in an epistemic position to know that an offender has genuinely instantiated CMS and is truly repentant, but that
is irrelevant. The point is that even if we did know, it would not, on ordinary views, justify sparing the offender of any punishment—and there
are surely logically conceivable circumstances in which we could be as
justified in believing this as we are in believing any other empirical claim.8
In any event, the mere possibility of such a situation is enough to make
the point that Michael Moore wants to make: according to our ordinary
intuitions, instantiating CMS and genuine repentance from wrongdoing
7
Michael S. Moore, “The Moral Worth of Retribution,” in Responsibility, Character, and the
Emotions, ed. Ferdinand Schoeman (Cambridge University Press, 1987).
8
Scientists are developing brain-imaging technology that can determine whether a person
is lying at a much higher degree of accuracy than existing polygraphs, which measure anxiety
levels. See, e.g., Robin Marantz Henig, “Looking for the lie” (New York Times Magazine, February 5, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/05/magazine/05lying.html?scp=2&sq=lie%20
detecting%20brain&st=cse. While they have not yet succeeded, it is nomologically possible
that such a device provide readings sufficiently reliable in justifying beliefs about whether a
person is telling the truth to justify basing punitive consequences on it.
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would not justify a judge in sparing a murderer from punishment—even
if there are no utilitarian reasons for punishing her. Ordinary intuitions,
then, are inconsistent with the idea that a person’s repentance is sufficient,
as a moral matter, to resolve debts she owes to another person in virtue of
some wrongful act.
One might think that repentance is sufficient to balance the moral ledger in the following sort of case. Suppose A wrongfully injures B and
would be willing to accept punishment and to compensate B for her injuries, where either punishment or compensation would be sufficient to
balance the ledger. But, for reasons beyond A’s control, A is unable to be
punished or provide compensation. In that case, one might argue that B
morally ought not to press the case against A, concluding that the debt
created by the wrong has been balanced.9
If this is the argument, I think it is problematic. If A is genuinely repentant but cannot make good on the debt she owes to B or be punished,
it is true that B morally ought not to press the case against A; there is
simply no point in it. A is already perfectly remorseful and cannot do anything about it, so pressing the case achieves no morally valuable end. (Notice, however, that if either of A’s disabilities were removed, the outcome
changes; an injured B ought to pursue at least partial compensation to
more fairly allocate burdens. And if A can be punished, she ought to be.)
But the claim that B morally ought not to press the case does not imply
the ledger between A and B has been balanced. It should be clear that A’s
disabilities and remorse are relevant in the issue of whether to pursue a
morally pointless act, but not in squaring the debt owed to B.10
C. Has Christ Received All Punishment on Behalf of Sinners?
One might argue that Christ’s suffering and death on the cross is sufficient
to pay all moral debts that might arise in connection with human wrongdoing. On this view, which draws from the penalty theory of the atonement, Christ voluntarily stood in for us and accepted all the punishment
that we deserve for our wrongdoing; Christ’s suffering on the cross was
thus sufficient to satisfy all the demands of justice that arise in connection
with human wrongdoing—including those involving debts owed to other
human beings. Thus, for example, there is no injustice in allowing salvation to Hitler since Christ bore all the punishment that Hitler deserves for
his wrongdoing.
9
I owe this objection to an anonymous referee, whose language I adopt here to describe
the objection so as to avoid the appearance of setting up a straw man.
10
But even if one can find a few examples like this that resist my analysis, it seems to
me that I have identified enough cases that cause problems for the idea that instantiating
CMS spares a saved sinner of all divine punishment. The strategy pursued above assumes
wrongly that one case in which the principles of corrective justice I describe do not apply is
enough to falsify my thesis. My thesis is the modest one that there are some cases in which it
is unfair, under applicable norms of corrective justice, for someone who instantiates CMS to
be spared of divine punishment. Finding cases where someone who instantiates CMS should
be spared of divine punishment simply does not do the needed work.
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The problem is that this move begs the question: the most that can be
assumed here is that Christ’s suffering and death was enough to annul all
our debts that arise from sins against God and hence that are owed to God.
And that is the standard theological story on these theories of atonement:
something had to be done about the debt we owe to God before God could
forgive sin—and Christ’s sacrifice on the cross was the gesture that addressed these debts. It is no part of these theological explanations of the
atonement that Christ bore the punishment or paid the debt for all wrongs;
he bore the punishment or paid the debt for all sins against God.
D. Is Forgiveness Morally Obligatory?
One might argue that God need not punish Christians who have repented
for their sins since those who have been wronged are morally obligated
to forgive repentant sinners for their sins. If, on this view, the victim of a
wrong is not willing to forgive a repentant Christian sinner for his or her
sins, then that breach of a moral obligation releases God from any need to
address the moral debt created by the act of wrongdoing.
This seems problematic for a variety of reasons. First, it seems inconsistent with certain bedrock mainstream Christian views. To begin, if salvation is a matter of grace and forgiveness of sin is at least one necessary
condition for being saved (instantiating CMS being another necessary
condition), then forgiveness cannot be morally obligatory—at least not as
a general matter. This is not to say that forgiveness is not morally good or
virtuous—perhaps even ideal; it is God’s perfect goodness that is invoked
to explain this remarkably generous act of God in forgiving us. Indeed, it
is because forgiveness is a matter of grace that profound gratitude is not
only appropriate but also seems morally required of us. But gratitude is
not generally required for acts that are morally required.
None of this makes sense if we assume that God is morally required
to forgive sin. As a conceptual matter, meeting an obligation is satisfying
a minimum standard of behavior that it would be wrong to violate. If in
telling the truth I am just meeting an obligation, then it would be wrong
to say I have done “good”; praise is warranted for behavior that is good
but not required—i.e., beyond the call of duty—and not merely for meeting one’s minimal obligations. We cannot have it both ways here: we must
either deny that God’s forgiveness evinces generosity beyond the call of
duty or deny that forgiveness is always morally obligatory.
Denying that forgiveness is always morally obligatory seems more sensible from the standpoint of ordinary moral intuitions. We frequently marvel at acts of forgiveness that seem extraordinary to us, regarding them
as acts of grace for which gratitude is owed. Consider, for example, the
response of the Amish community to the murder of five Amish schoolchildren by Charles Roberts, who then committed suicide. The decision
of the community to attend Roberts’s funeral as a demonstration of their
forgiveness was considered astonishing and made headlines around the
world: words used to describe their gesture include “grace,” “noble but
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impossible ideal,” and “shocking”11—not exactly the language one would
expect if their forgiveness was morally obligated.
Indeed, many people shared the reaction of Jeff Jacoby who cited the
Bible in an oft-discussed op-ed piece arguing that the Amish should not
have forgiven Roberts:
But hatred is not always wrong, and forgiveness is not always deserved. I
admire the Amish villagers’ resolve to live up to their Christian ideals even
amid heartbreak, but how many of us would really want to live in a society
in which no one gets angry when children are slaughtered? In which even
the most horrific acts of cruelty were always and instantly forgiven? There
is a time to love and a time to hate, Ecclesiastes teaches. If anything deserves
to be hated, surely it is the pitiless murder of innocents.12

Jacoby was not just denying that such forgiveness was obligatory or good;
he was claiming that it was wrong to forgive such acts.
This, it seems to me, is too strong, but it does gesture in the way of
explaining why forgiveness might be good but not required in some
cases. There are cases in which wrongdoing results in injury that can be
adequately compensated for; in those cases, forgiveness and compensation might suffice to balance the moral ledger between offender and victim. In some cases, however, wrongdoing results in a loss that cannot be
significantly addressed by compensation; in such instances, the victim
must carry around a grievous loss for the rest of her life. Charles Roberts
inflicted such a loss on the parents of those children and on the Amish
community; there is nothing that can begin to compensate for the loss of
a child and the terrible grief that comes with it. While the community’s
decision to forgive Roberts seems praiseworthy, ordinary intuition suggests that it would not be morally wrong for at least the parents not to
have forgiven Roberts.
The idea that forgiveness is a matter of grace, rather than requirement,
seems to conform to our ordinary response to especially grievous wrongdoing. If, e.g., the national dialogue in our country is any indication, most
of us, Christian and non-Christian alike, seem not to have forgiven alQaeda for 9/11. It is not just that we are waging “war on terrorism” as a
matter of self-defense; many of us see it as being justified in retaliation of
an evil that should not be forgiven.
The language of the Lord’s Prayer might be thought to support the idea
that forgiveness is always morally required but, upon closer look, better
supports the view that it is not. It is sometimes overlooked that the forgiveness we ask for in the Lord’s Prayer—given to us in slightly different
forms in Matthew 6:9–13 and Luke 11:2–4—is constrained by the forgiveness we extend to other people: “Forgive us for our transgressions as we
11
Donald B. Kraybill, Steven M. Nolt, and David L. Weaver-Zercher, Amish Grace: How
Forgiveness Transcended Tragedy (Jossey-Bass, 2007); excerpt available at http://www.pbs.org/
wnet/religionandethics/week1103/interview5.html.
12
Jeff Jacoby, “Undeserved Forgiveness” (Boston Globe, October 8, 2006), http://www.boston
.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2006/10/08/undeserved_forgiveness/.
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forgive those who transgress against us” is the familiar petition. This seems to
suggest that God will forgive us only insofar as we forgive others. While
this might seem to suggest that forgiveness is always obligatory, it does
not: otherwise, our failure to forgive others could not justify God’s not
fully forgiving us. Indeed, it seems to confirm that forgiveness is at least
sometimes conferred as a matter of grace and that it is morally good, rather than required. The petition teaches us to be graceful and merciful where
it is not required so as to receive God’s grace and mercy in the form of
forgiveness where it is not required.13
But even if it were morally obligatory, it does not follow that punishment is not required as a moral matter. To begin, the above suggests that
in some cases compensation is needed to fully address a moral debt owed
by a wrongdoer to a victim; it would not be surprising if even repentant
wrongdoers nonetheless deserved some punishment. Again, most people
would take the position that even if we knew that a guilty murderer was
as repentant for the killing as one could be, the murderer should still, as a
moral matter, be punished.
One might argue that there is at least one circumstance in which forgiveness is morally required. As an intuitive matter, A seems to have
wronged C if (i) A petitions for and accepts B’s forgiveness for a serious
transgression that A committed, and (ii) C petitions for A’s forgiveness
for a morally trifling transgression that C committed, but A withholds
forgiveness from C. If so, then A is morally obligated to forgive C under
these conditions.
One might reasonably think this principle entails that human beings are
morally required to forgive all moral debts owed to them because these
debts are morally trifling compared to those that God forgives. On this
familiar reasoning, the magnitude of the wrongdoing is determined by
the magnitude of the being that is wronged. Thus, whereas the magnitude
of even the sum total of Hitler’s wrongs against human beings is a mindbogglingly large finite quantity, it is still infinitesimally small compared
to the infinite magnitude of his wrongs against God. Accordingly, human
beings are obligated to forgive even the worst wrongs.
There are several problems here. First, this principle would apply only
to Christians who have petitioned for and accepted God’s forgiveness. At
most, this principle would show that Christians owe moral forgiveness
for debts owed them by other Christians. It does not have application to
atheists, agnostics, and persons of other faiths. So it cannot address the
general problem.
Second, even if it were true that it applied universally, the claim that
we are obligated to forgive debts owed to us does not imply that God’s
forgiveness can settle those debts. The fact that it might be morally wrong
13
One might argue that those who have been forgiven by God are obligated to forgive
others. Even if this is true, this would only apply to those who have been saved. There would
still be a problem of unresolved evil for those who have not. See note 6, above.
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for me to withhold forgiveness does not imply that someone else’s forgiveness can release the wrongdoer from a debt that is owed to me.14
Finally, even if we assume that the magnitude of a wrong is determined
by the magnitude of the being wronged, this is of little help here. The
claim that Hitler’s debt to human beings is small relative to Hitler’s debt
to God does not entail that Hitler’s debt to human beings can be justly
ignored. A finite debt owed to a finite being might be small compared to
an infinite debt owed to an infinite being, but it does not follow that it is
morally trifling. Surely, the debts owed by a murderer to the victim and
to the people who love the victim are not morally trifling—even if they
are finite and hence small compared to those owed to God. A substantial
injury to a finite being is a morally serious matter—even if infinitesimally
small compared to the magnitude of wrongs against God.
Ordinary intuitions and standard theology agree: justice demands that
moral debts be settled in some manner. If a being has the ability and authority to act in a way that resolves the moral debts, then she ought to do
so. And here it is crucial to note that it is possible in every relevant respect
for God to act in such a way as to address the debt created by Hitler’s evil
acts. Clearly, it is both logically and causally possible for an omnipotent
God to impose some sort of punishment on Hitler before accepting him
into heaven. If it is logically and causally possible for an omnipotent being
to consign someone to hell for an eternity, then it is logically and causally
possible for such a being to do so for a finite period.
E. Can God Legitimately Demand that the Victims Forgive and
Justify Sparing the Wrongdoer Punishment if the Victim Wrongfully Declines?
Another response takes this shape. God can legitimately demand that the
victim of a wrongdoer forgive the wrongdoer; should the victim sin against
God by refusing, God can cancel any of the remaining moral debts.
While refusal of a legitimate demand from God is surely sinful, this
reply is problematic because it is unclear that a morally perfect God could
legitimately demand an act of forgiveness if it is not antecedently morally required. In other words, if the victim is not already under an obligation to forgive the wrongdoer, it is not clear what would justify a morally
perfect God in making a demand with this consequence. It seems, again,
not to take seriously enough the victim’s moral status as person with
legitimate claims against others. Of course, one might be conditionally
14
One might argue that, in some circumstances, a wrongdoer is not an appropriate subject
of punishment if he does not pay his moral debt to his victim. For example, if A owes B a
trifling sum of money while B has been released from a great debt by his victim, one might
think that A should not be pressed to pay his trifling debt to B. First, I do not share the intuition that the fact that B has been released by someone else for a more substantial debt entails
that B is obligated not to pursue the debt owed by A—unless the release of B has been made
conditional upon B’s release of A. Second, and more importantly, even if the argument succeeds here, it is not enough to refute the analysis above. I could easily modify the principle
to exclude such cases. A more powerful argument strategy is needed here. I am indebted to
an anonymous referee for this point. See note 10 above.
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required to forgive others to receive God’s forgiveness, and that is surely
a very good reason to forgive others. But someone might opt to withhold
forgiveness in these circumstances without committing any sin. Of course,
such a person will not benefit from God’s forgiveness because the latter’s
willingness to forgive is tied to the former’s. However, this is a prudential
matter—and not necessarily a moral matter if forgiveness is not always
morally required. God can legitimately demand forgiveness only where it
is antecedently required; and it seems clear that forgiveness is not always
morally obligatory.
F. Is the Wrongdoer’s Repentance Together with Full Compensation from God
Enough to Balance the Moral Ledger?
Perhaps the most powerful response is as follows. Anyone instantiating
CMS will be genuinely repentant for her sins and apologetic towards all
the victims of her sins—indeed, such a person may be afforded an opportunity to apologize to all her victims. Although the victim might be
at moral liberty to decline to accept the apology and forgive, God could
nonetheless balance the moral ledger between victim and repentant Christian sinner by fully compensating the victim for the injuries done to the
victim. If so, then God can legitimately spare the repentant sinner of any
punitive or quasi-punitive consequences.
The problem here is that it is not clear that God can fully compensate
all injuries. We saw that we are limited in the extent to which we can fully
compensate injuries because our only available currency, money, is incommensurable with certain kinds of injury in this sense: money cannot place
the injured party in the same position she would have been in prior to the
injury. Perhaps an omnipotent God has the ability to fully compensate all
injuries because God has so many more means for doing so at His disposal; indeed, God can offer as compensation eternal bliss—and nothing
could compensate for any injury better than that.
There are two problems with the idea that God could compensate with
eternal bliss a victim who refuses to forgive an apologetic, repentant sinner. First, it seems inconsistent with the idea that instantiating CMS during one’s lifetime is a necessary condition for being saved and escaping
punishment. If God can’t offer salvation to those who do not instantiate
CMS, the most he can offer such people is some other lesser good not
involving being in heaven. But if traditional Christianity is correct, there
are only two possible ultimate fates: heaven or hell. So the only kind of
lesser benefit he could offer them would be a milder form of damnation.
Even assuming this is an option compatible with traditional Christianity
(as is suggested by the conception of hell developed in Dante’s Inferno), it
seems implausible to think that “damnation lite” could count as adequate
compensation.
Second, it is unclear that even eternal bliss can compensate for all injuries. Ivan, a protagonist in Dostoevsky’s famous The Brothers Karamazov,
aptly makes the point:
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Tell me yourself, I challenge you—answer. Imagine that you are creating a
fabric of human destiny with the object of making men happy in the end, giving them peace and rest at last, but that it was essential and inevitable to torture to death only one tiny creature—that baby beating its breast with its fist,
for instance—and to found that edifice on its unavenged tears, would you
consent to be the architect on those conditions? Tell me, and tell the truth.15

Now the claim here is a strong one: the universal salvation of all human
beings cannot compensate for the unjust suffering of an innocent infant.
Perhaps this is too strong, but it does raise the same problem that humans encounter with respect to compensation: no matter how good a
compensatory payoff might be, it cannot restore a person to the position
they would have been in had they not endured the pain and suffering
associated with an injury. Past pain and suffering seem very difficult to
compensate for with a future-looking payment—no matter how good that
payment might be.
If, of course, the payment is good enough, a person might be willing to
sell some pain and suffering for a future payment: I would let you hit me
in the face for a payment of $10,000,000. In such cases, a person might happily accept the offer and forgive the wrongdoer—which might succeed in
balancing the moral ledger. But there are difficulties even here; as we saw
above, punishment might still be required even in this case. As we have
seen, compensation, together with genuine repentance on the part of the
wrongdoer and forgiveness on the part of the victim, might not suffice to
eliminate the need for punishment to restore the moral ledger. In the case
of a robbery, for example, punishment might be required on retributivist
grounds to balance the moral ledger, even when there is no utilitarian
point in punishing. For all we can confidently assert, this might also be
true in the case where one’s ultimate fate is determined.
G. So Much the Worse for Ordinary Intuitions
One might simply argue, in response, that if the idea that God can forgive
all sin and thereby cancel all debt is inconsistent with ordinary intuitions,
so much the worse for ordinary intuitions.
But giving up ordinary intuitions comes at a cost. It is important to
realize that moral intuitions frequently play an important role in philosophy of religion and even theology. Many philosophers, for example, reject
the Divine Command Theory on the strength of the idea that it is simply
not true that any propositional content might be morally binding in virtue of being commanded by God; not even God, on this familiar line of
reasoning, could bring it about that it is morally good to torture live infants simply to watch them suffer. Similarly, theologians have frequently
rejected certain interpretations of Scripture on the ground that they are
inconsistent with certain moral principles; passages that have been used
15
Fyodor Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, trans. C. Garnett (Modern Library, 1996),
Book V, chapter 4.
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to justify slavery and racial segregations are two interpretations that come
immediately to mind in this regard.
While there are surely instances in which one must be prepared to give
up one’s moral intuitions as fallible, there are only so many core moral
intuitions one can deny in connection with God’s activity without raising
an issue as to whether God is deserving of worship (a moral response)
or simply a being to be feared (a prudential response). I think biting the
bullet should be a response of last resort—just as it should in the case of
other important morally charged issues in philosophical theology, like the
problem of evil or the proportionality problem for the traditional views
about hell.
VII. Conclusions
In this essay, I have argued that the doctrine that instantiating CMS is
sufficient to spare a person of all punishment is difficult to reconcile with
mainstream views about what justice requires in response to wrongdoing. According to these views, justice requires that the debts owed to the
victims of wrongdoing be resolved in some way to correct the moral disturbance that wrongful behavior introduces into the world. While it is
true, on Christian doctrine, that Christ’s death released us from a debt that
we owe for our wrongs, the relevant debt was owed to God for wrongs
committed against God. But this suggests that allowing a wicked person to
escape all punishment on the strength of a deathbed conversion leaves unpaid moral debts: to the extent that her wrongdoing against other persons
has never been forgiven by the victims or punished, her salvation leaves
behind unresolved injustice to her victims. To the extent that God allows
such injustice, it seems to conflict with God’s moral perfection.16
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